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PHILOSOPHY, SOCIOLOGY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL WELFARE:
1
A CONCEPTUAL STARTING POINT

Robert D. Herman
School of Administration
University of Missouri-Kansas City

In this paper I want to explore and 2begin to elucidate a fundamental problem in social welfare theory.
The problem centers on the
conception of the relation between individuals and social structure.
Before proceeding with this task, it is important to note the senses
in which the term "social welfare" will be used. The term has two
basic senses, deriving from two more or less distinct intellectual
traditions. In one sense the term refers to the provision of goods
and services to needy individuals, either through government "transfers"
or private philanthropy. In this comparatively narrow sense social
welfare is a characteristic of industrialized societies (see Wilensky,
1975, for an empirical investigation of the determinants of welfare
spending) and has to do with social workers, welfare institutions and
the poor. In the second, broader, sense social welfare has to do with
all the members and institutions of a society. This sense derives
from the concerns of moral and political philosophers about the
structure of society and the production and distribution of basic
values (such as wealth, power, liberty, equality and happiness). Moralpolitical philosophy asks what values are desirable and how can they be
justified, and, given a set of values, what kind of society and what
kind of individual is most likely to lead to the fullest realization
of those values.

IPaper originally presented as "Philosophy, Sociology and Social
Welfare: Some Issues, Problems and Possibilities," at the annual
meeting of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, San Francisco,
California, August 22-25, 1975.
2

The problem derives from and pertains to sociological, or preferably social, theory more generally, though going straight to that locus
is beyond the scope of this paper.

3

Until recently social scientists had little interest in social
welfare conceived in the broad philosophical sense. One apparent
exception is that branch of economics known as "welfare economics."
This exception is more apparent than real since economists and other
social scientists have generally accepted Arrow's (1951; 1963) demonstration that a socially optimal income distribution cannot be derived
from individual utility preferences ("wants"), unless it is assumed
that such preferences, and the satisfaction derived from their fulfillment, are the same across all individuals. Since this assumption
cannot be justified and the empirical evidence contradicts it, welfare
economics has degenerated into a set of "proofs" that, given the
assumptions underlying the theory of perfectly competitive markets,
capitalism guarantees the attainment of maximum social welfare (see,
Because "welfare economics" takes as
for example, Ferguson, 1966).
settled what is problematical and is uncritically based on a particular
philosophical conception of the individual-social structure relation
I bring
more to say of it.
(i.e.,
utilitarianism), I will have little
it up here only to indicate that it has been one approach to the broad
issue of social welfare.
Other than the moribund "welfare economics" approach, modern
4
social science has had little interest in the philosophical conception
of social welfare. Such disinterest can be traced to the philosophical
foundations of modern social science--to logical positivism and its
impact on the character of the social sciences. Very briefly, "progress"
in the social sciences has been seen as dependent upon the collection
(design, methodology) and analysis (hypothesis testing and theoretical
inference) of theoretically relevant data (collection of data is guided
by hypothetical statements deduced from fundamental axioms) where the
are publicly disseminated and eventually
results of such activities
help to.clarify the theoretical structure and build an explanatory
system.J Though historians (Kuhn, 1970) and philosophers of science,
including logical positivists, have explored and continue to explore
a number of problems in this foundation, most practicing social scientists learn (?) that this is the foundation, the only foundation, of
public, intersubjectively verifiable knowledge. Such a foundation and
its consequences for social science have precluded any investigation
of social welfare theory that is not "narrowly" empirical and based
upon positivistic rules. Any non-positivistic investigation of social

3, use the terms social scientist and social sciences deliberately
to emphasize the general (rather than the discipline specific) nature
of the problem. The reader, however, should be made aware that, as a
sociologist, much of the paper draws on and is directly addressed to
sociology.
4

Marxism, which has always had a tenuous relation to "mainstream"
social science, is something of an exception to this statement. The
Marxist view of social welfare will be briefly examined later.
5

This summary is not intended as an adequate or complete account
of logical positivism. A number of widely available books (e.g. Nagel,
1961; Kaplan, 1964; and Hanson, 1971) contain clear presentations of
logical positivism.

welfare, while it might be praised by social scientists, is labeled,
"normative," "subjective," or "philosophical," which implies that such
an investigation is non-scientific and thus not a reliable guide to
knowledge. There are increasingly obvious signs that many social
scientists are experiencing heightened doubts about their enterprise
and its importance to humanity, and corresponding dogbts about logical
positivism as the foundation of the social sciences.
What are the
intellectual, as distinguished from the psychological or social, sources
of these doubts and the accompanying disquiet?
Most simply, the social sciences entail the relativization of perspectives (Zaner, 1970), a proliferation of ways of viewing, of knowing.
The relativization of perspectives extends to all other social things.
One can view or "know" a thing from the "sociological" point of view,
from the "economic" point of view, from the "practical" point of view,
etc. No doubt this relativization has had some useful consequences,
but the deeper consequences have only recently been receiving widespread attention. The deeper consequences started to be noticed when
the relativizing weapons of the social sciences were turned inward,
upon the social sciences and social scientists themselves. As sociological studies of sociology began to accumulate and "sink-in," the
conclusion had to be faced that the sociological point of view and the
knowledge it produces is socially determined, and thus uncertain,
relative and suspiciously arbitrary. In short, the social sciences
have eliminated the possibility of reason from human experience and
action, including that experience and action called social science.
Those familiar with phenomenology will recognize that this discussion of the relativization of perspectives taps the same basic
issues as Husserl's (1970) concern with the "crisis of European
(Western) sciences." According to Natanson (1973) there are several
facets to the contemporary crisis of science. Of these the deepest
is that the sciences deny the centrality of reason in understanding
human experience. This characteristic of science
. . . manifests itself less in programmatic
utterances than it does in refusal to recognize
the possible legitimacy of eternal truth, of
essential knowledge, and of universal science.
In place of the ideal of what Husserl called
'rigorous science,' primordial apodicticity, there
is proclaimed the superiority and even the desirability of patchwork analysis, limited questions
posed in restricted ways, in order to achieve
partial results. Circumscription is elevated into
a new ideal. No indictment of science is intended
here, for the problem is not the adequacy of

6

For a highly readable presentation of the critique of logical
positivism as the foundation of sociology see Friedrichs (1970:135222). For a philosophical critique of the foundations of the social
sciences see Zaner (1970:51-78).
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concrete procedures and results in the various
sciences but the philosophical nature of the
(Natanson, 1973: 41-42).
scientific enterprise.
Returning to social welfare, the "crisis of scientific relativization" is seen in the abandonment and disparagement of formulating a
general theory of social welfare. The fragmented, partial and highly
contingent nature of "knowledge" in the social sciences, in conjunction
with the normative/descriptive dichotomy derived from logical positivism,
have prevented any attempt to formulate a general (i.e. philosophicalscientific) theory of social welfare. Instead, we have a vast collection of positivistic studies of particular social welfare "problems"
These studies have attempted to either describe
(in the narrow sense).
the dimensions and extent of a particular welfare problem (e.g.,
malnutrition, economic insecurity, child abuse, or drug dependency) or
to investigate the causes and consequences of a particular social
welfare problem. Many studies also ventured to propose "solutions"
to these particular problems. The justifications, beyond that of
scientific validity, are principally of three kinds. One is to adopt
the values or political views of the organization, if any, sponsoring
the research. The second is to justify the proposed solutions by
predicting the negative (as defined by established social values)
consequences of failure to do otherwise. The final kind of justification for proposed solutions is to invoke what are uncomfortably
recognized as more or less arbitrary (since they cannot apparently be
derived from science) personal values. These kinds of justification
Of course, many studies of
are often found in various combinations.
welfare problems do not propose solutions, arguing that solutions
must be based on values and values are outside the realm of science.
The notion that the social sciencs are, or can be, "value free" is
widely debated today, and many have concluded that they are not and
cannot be. The debate over the place of values in social science is
part of the larger crisis of the social sciences.
Interestingly, though, one finds little explicit recognition of
the crisis in the social science work (as opposed to the commentary)
published in the leading journals. Perhaps the disciplinary elite and
their gate-keepers are unwilling to accept the conclusion that there
is a crisis and thus work that attempts to build upon a new foundation.
On the other hand, there may be little or no work based upon a new
foundation being submitted, and there is no consensual basis for
evaluating any that is. While the case for the inadequacy of the
value-free, "objective" logical positivist foundation of the social
sciences is strong, how to and with what to "replace" that long-standing
foundation is not at all clear. In the absence of an alternative foundation that is intellectually justified and widely accepted it may be
reasonable to continue work founded upon, and wholly within the
prescripts of, logical positivism. Phenomenology has been receiving
increasing attention as a new foundation for the social sciences, though
many problems remain both within phenomenology itself and with regard
to the relation between phenomenology and sociology (see Heap and Roth,
Though many of my remarks in this paper have been "inspired"
1973).
by phenomenology, this is not an attempt to work out a phenomenological
sociology. Rather it is an attempt to develop an alternative conceptual
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basis for a general theory of social welfare. As such the paper is
concerned with social theory directly and not with foundations, though
the conceptual basis is "inspired" by the phenomenological critique of
science.
The critique of logical positivism and the possibility of phenomenology as a new foundation is the more distant and fundamental source
of my concern with the relation between sociology, philosophy and the
theory of social welfare. The more immediate and direct source of
this concern is derived from the recent attention of sociologists to
moral-political philosophy, in particular with the attention Coleman
(1974a) and other social scientists (e.g. MacRae, 1973; Hart, 1974;
and Harmon, 1974) have given to John Rawls's (1971) A Theory 2f Justice.
As Coleman (1974A) notes the last decade or so has witnessed, after
the accumulation of vast numbers of research results on inequality and
poverty, a resurgence of interest in moral-political philosophy and
the attempts to join traditional sociology to moral-political philosophy
(Coleman, 1974a; 1974b).
That is, there is a developing interest in
joining sociology and moral-political philosophy at the level of theory,
as opposed to the interest in philosophy (epistemology) as foundational.
More exactly, Rawls (1971) has resurrected in sociology a renewed
examination of the linkage between moral-political philosophy and
sociology. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to review the
intellectual history of sociology, I think it can be safely said that
sociology's "founding fathers" (Marx, Weber and Durkheim) addressed
and their work built upon moral-political philosophical issues.
As
Atkinson (1971) shows the fundamental contribution of the "founding
fathers" was, despite other differences, the solidification of the
sociological perspective that human behavior (in a broad sense) is
socially determined, is subject to laws or rules or social facts that
inhere in the supra-individual social structure. Though the work of
both Marx and Weber contained elements of a voluntaristic, non-deterministic, conception of human behavior, that much smaller part of their
work has not, by and large, been incorportated into modern sociology
(Atkinson, 1971).
In short, from its beginnings, sociology has adopted
a "descending" view of the relation between individuals and the social
structure. The social structure has been conceived as prior to and
determinative of individual level behavior. In simplest form this
basic conception holds that the social structure, the collectivity,
creates concrete individuals (or "natural" persons as Coleman, 1974b,
puts it) with their complex combinations of skills, values, lifeways
and behaviors. Clearly this conception runs the risk of conceiving
of individuals as completely socialized, completely socially determined. Wrong (1961) long ago pointed this out, though more to argue
for the inclusion in sociological theory of a biological-psychological
determinism than to argue for non-deterministic element. Such a
program has recently received renewed attention (e.g. Tarter, 1973;
Van den Berghe, 1974).
This conceptual basis, which I have termed
(following Coleman, 1974b) the "descending" view is similar to the
"normative paradigm" discussed by Wilson (1970).
This basic sociological conception has never been completely
dominant as the continued vitality of symbolic interactionism and the
"interpretative paradigm" (Wilson, 1970) attests. Symbolic inter-

actionism and other interpretative perspectives reflect, to a certain
extent and often only implicitly, an "ascending" view of the relation
between individuals and social structure. Symbolic interactionism and
other interpretative perspectives hold that human behavior, in any
situation, cannot be accounted for except through the meanings that
the participants give a situation. Such accounts may utilize classification schemes and be related to deductive theoretical statements.
The account or explanation, must be built upon the meanings, the interpretations, that the situation has for the human beings involved. Thus,
interpretative perspectives imply that human behavior is not entirely
determined, and that institutions (the social structure) are based upon
and continually re-created and modified by the behavior of numberous
concrete individuals. As far as I have been able to determine the
interpretative perspectives in sociology do not work out or explicitly
address the intellectual and social theoretical consequences of the
"ascending" view. Those consequences are more clearly and more fully
expressed in moral-political philosophy, and it is to the moralpolitical philosophy of Rawls (1971) and Coleman (1974a; 1974b) that
I now turn.
Coleman's book, Power and the Structure of Society (1974b), which
preceeded his review essay (Coleman, 1974a) on Rawls (1971), is an
analysis of the social structural consequences of the emergence of
those new persons before the law, corporate actors (e.g. business corporations, goverrnent agencies, voluntary organizations). After tracing
the emergence and legal recognition of corporate persons, Coleman (1974b)
presents his chief thesis: That, at least in Western societies,
corporate actors exist separately from natural persons and have usurped
more and more of the power available in society with damaging psychological consequences for natural persons (see also, Coleman, 1973). In
effect, Coleman is offering a new dichotomous conception of social
structure, in place of bourgeoisie/working class or elite/mass we have
natural/corporate persons. This distinction is offered as fundamental
and capable of organizing and guiding research on the social structure
of modern society. Coleman 1974b) also offers some proposals whereby
natural persons may gain restitution from corporate persons and some
advice on learning to live with corporate persons. The book contains
a number of useful points, though I think it dangerously close to
reifying corporate persons and overemphasizes the notion that the
fundamental social division is between corporate persons and natural
While clearly in the realm of moral-political philosophy,
persons.
in the book (1974b) Coleman does not explicitly connect his views to
the moral-political philosophy tradition.
Coleman does connect his views to traditional moral-political
philosophy in his review essay (1974a) on Rawls. In that review
Coleman contrasts Rawl's (1971) two principles of justice with the

7

Briefly the two principles are: (1) "Each person is to have an
equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties
(2) "Social and
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all."
economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: (a) to
the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just
savings principle, and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity." (Rawls: 1971:302)
Of the two, the first principle is prior.
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results of sociological research on educational inequality and with
Parsonian social theory. On the bases of these contrasts Coleman concludes that the principles, but especially the conceptual basis, the
starting point of the theory must be modified. As Coleman (1974a) sees
it, there are two basic conceptual bases for moral-political philosophy
and the theory of social welfare: utilitarianism (Smith, Bentham) and
social contract theory (Hobbes, Rousseau). Rawls theory is based upon
the social contract view as is Coleman's modification. The principles
of justice are, for Rawls, the "basic clauses" of the social contract
that individuals would choose in an "original position" (where all are
ignorant of what social position and possessions that will eventually
have).
As Coleman (1974a: 746) correctly notes the content of the
social contract does not necessarily follow from the original position.
While plausible, it is an apriori psychological assumption. Coleman
goes on to suggest that this assumption could be subjected to empirical
test. I think not. Any empirical test would have to be conducted with
real, already socialized individuals and not with imaginary individuals
in an imaginary original position. At any rate there could be no
clear-cut, unambiguous empirical test of the assumption.
For both logical and sociological reasons, Coleman concludes that
Rawls starting point must be modified. Coleman does not reject the
social contract notion.
Instead he argues that, rather than positing
a single social contract, we should conceive of individuals as establishing, through the rational investment of individually created
resources, multiple social contracts. This is an important modification
for it connects the social contract and utilitarian schools of thought,
retaining what seem to be the most reasonable and desirable aspects of
each--the ability to account for the creation of "independent" and
powerful "corporate persons" (including the state) from the social
contract viewpoint and the emphasis on choice, rational self-interest
and individual rights from the utilitarian viewpoint. That this
modification reinforces and restates the pluralist conception of society
is recognized by Coleman (1974a: 760).
Though Coleman seems to assume
that pluralism is an accurate description of the contemporary structure
of U.S. society, there is a good deal of theoretical work (e.g. Gamson,
1968; Bachrach, 1967; and Pateman, 1970) and empirical evidence (e.g.
Hamilton, 1972) that raises very serious questions about the validity
8
of pluralis6 theory. That Coleman's developing moral-political theory
can be used to further justify and legitimize capitalism and unrepresentative democracy (see Gamson, 1968) is also obvious and objectionable.

8

As Coleman notes in the review essay, the details of his moralpolitical ("Normative") position is not presented there, though it will,
apparently, be published in some form soon.
91 am not suggesting that this is Coleman's intent, but only that,
regardless of his intentions, others may so use it.
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It is objectionable because social contract, as well as utilitarian,
theories are based upon the "ascending" conception of social structure.
In particular, both the social contract and utilitarian theories conceive of rights and resources as inhering in individuals. Both the
social contract and utilitarian theories developed in a period when the
"divine right" of monarchs and other totalitarian "descending" concepts
of social structure were being challenged. As such they are important
and valuable ideational elements in the historical development of civil
liberties. What is objectionable about these "ascending" conceptions
of social structure is that they assume that individuals in some
"natural state" (which cannot be observed, which can only be imagined)
are "naturally" (i.e. without having been influenced by anything other
than their biological-genetic endowment and physical environment)
egotistical, entirely and narrowly self-interested, but rational, knowing
what they want and stopping at nothing to effectively and efficiently
obtain it. No one today would claim that the "natural state" ever
existed empirically, and all recognize the Hobbesian question and its
assumptions as "fictions". In the face of anthropological and sociological evidence that individuals do not exist independently and prior
to a social system, the perpetuation of these fictions--fictions which
unreasonably justify inequalities--is objectionable. Thus, any attempt
to base a general theory of social welfare solely on analytical
individualism, on the "ascending" conception of the relation between
individuals and social structure, must be rejected.
Does this imply, then, that we must adopt the "descending" conception? What are the welfare theory implications of a decision to
put the collectivity prior to real individuals, to conceive of rights,
resources, and achievements as inhering not in discrete individuals
but in social relations, in a collectivity? Perhaps thel5 asiest way
to answer these questions is to consider Marxist theory,
where the
implications are clearly discernible. In capitalist societies the
knowledge, beliefs, interests and behavior of individuals are seen as
an expression of class interests derived from (determined by) an
individual's social structural relation to the means of production.
In the struggle to overthrow capitalism the welfare of real individuals
is secondary to the "welfare" (politicization, revolutionary potential,
etc.) of the working class as a social entity, a corporate actor,
itself. In capitalist societies individuals, due to the mode and
relationship producttion, are alienated, estranged from themselves. In
the struggle to overthrow capitalism individuals must be and are subordinated (alienated) to the interest of the party or movement. Of
course, this is inevitable, necessary and justified by the notion that
only when and after a pure communistic society is established, where
classes and the state have disappeared, can individuals be truly free
and full, and authentic individuality realized.
Be that as it may, in
those societies where capitalism has been overturned and a "dictatorship
of the proletariat" established, as a necessary transition to the pure

1Of course, there is no such thing as "marxist theory," only
several varieties. My interest here is not in the details of the complicated labyrinth of Marxist theory, but in the basic and broadly
shared starting point.

-378-

communistic society, most real individuals continue to be subordinated
to the interests, the welfare, of the collectivity.
All of this flows fromland is reasonable, given the basic conceptions of Marxist theory.
Without addressing the question of the
adequacy of the Marxist structural categories and the analysis of the
dynamics of social change, is the basic premise, the "descending"
conception of the relation between individuals and social structure
viable? In a word, no. The "descending" conception must be rejected
for the reasons advanced earlier in the discussion of the "crisis of
realitivization."
Any "descending" conception, whether that of academic
sociology or Marxism, faces a "platform" problem.
If it is true that
human actions and the meanings that human beings give to those actions
are determined by social structural "laws," then how--what platform
is available?--can it be that those human actions and meanings called
social science or Marxism are any different? Either one must assume
some variant of the "free-floating intellectual" notion, or one must
assume that the "methods" of social science (whether of the "bourgeois"
or Marxist type is immaterial) are fundamentally different than the
methods (to knowledge) of ordinary people. Neither assumption can be
substantiated for lack of a platform.
If a general theory of social welfare cannot legitimately be based
on either an "ascending" analytical individualism or the "descending"
priority of the collectivity, what remains as a starting point?
Since
the only two alternatives must be rejected, it is time to justifiably
assume, as Fromm (1941; 1955; 1965) has long urged, that humanity
occupies an unique place in nature (inclduing society).
We are both
part of nature, and thus subject to the "laws of nature," and we are
(potentially and variably) aware, through reason, of this.
This conception implies that social "laws," social relations, can be "changed"
as a consequence of awareness and reason. No doublt the structure of
society, and one's place W 2 that structure, differentially limits, and
to that extent determines,
an individual's opportunities for developing
and exercising reason. To recognize that behavior has antecedents and
is limited by a variety of social forces, is not the same thing, and
does not entail, the assertion that all behavior is ultimately caused
by social forces and events.
It is not that some behavior is random
or non-determined. Rather, sometimes individuals are their "own causes."
That is, individual beliefs and behaviors can be due to reasons
(intellectually determined) rather than to motives, reinforcement hisstories, internalized role expectations and social positions. This

11

The same basic implications, though employing
different structural categories and terms, could be derived from any other theory based
on "descending" conception of the relation between individuals and
social structure.
12Under
this conception the notion of selective determinism
becomes
logically meaningful. As Hollander (1973) argues, selective determinism
is inconsistent with a sociology founded exclusively on the "descending"
conception.
His argument also clearly, though unintentionally, demonstrates the crisis of the social sciences and the necessity of bringing
reason back in.

-379-

conception retains the possibility of choice and creativity in social
behavior (which if we but look are evident), but drops the assumption
(common to "ascending" conceptions) that such choice and creativity is
necessarily based on narrow self-interest, and the resulting implication
that existing social institutions in capitalist societies, by controlling
and channeling this anti-social self-interest, are, on balance, the best
thing for everybody.
If we accept, as I believe we must, this voluntaristic and humanistic conceptual starting point, three broad implications for a general
theory of social welfare can be noted. First, what place does social
welfare, in the narrower sense, have? Many, no doubt, are amazed and
indignant that so must time, thought and paper have been given to
philosophical and abstract theoretical concerns when social welfare is
under increasing attack and when the welfare of many has been even
further degraded.
Though this paper has not been addressed to these
real and immediate problems, the analysis presented here does have
three fairly specific implications for social welfare, in the narrower
sense. The least important of these is that the conceptual starting
point proposed here in no way obviates the need for social welfare
efforts in the narrower sense. The conceptual basis proposed here
recognizes that large numbers of people are systematically put (or
kept) in oppressive socio-economic circumstances as a consequence of
the social structure of industrial capitalism. The conceptual basis
proposed here is consistent with efforts to strengthen and increase
the benefits derived from traditional social welfare programs. A
second, and more important, implication, of this voluntaristic-humanistic conception is that it provides a rationale, an intellectual
rationale, that justifies efforts to strengthen traditional welfare
programs and create new ones. This justification derives from the
claim that traditinal welfare programs must first provide for a minimum
standard of living and then, on that basis, provide opportunities for
those whose lives are, compared to others, highly and oppressively
determined to really exercise choice and reason. Finally this conception implies that social welfare, conceived as based on the opportunity for choice, for being one's own cause, must be seen as both a
characteristic of the collectivity and of individuals, and not something
that applies only to an aggregation of individuals at the bottom of the
present stratification system.
Closely following that narrower implication, the second broad
implication of this starting point concerns the conception and measurement of social welfare. As Gross and Straussman (1974) argue the "social
indicators movement," which began as an alternative to, and challenged,
the exclusive reliance of governmental policymakers on economic concepts
and data, has, by and large, become highly "economistic." Present
economic and "social" indicators (see, for example, Social Indicators,
1973, Executive Office of The President: Office of Management and
Budget, 1973), based primarily on data aggregated across individuals,
measures levels, and to some extent the distribution, of such social
Such data
system "outputs" as income, health, education and crime.
are important, but they are incomplete. A voluntaristic-humanistic
theory of social welfare would also look to the extent and distribution
of opportunities for choice and creativity which, at the least, are
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consistent with (and at best strengthen or create) such opportunities
for others.
Clearly must remains to be done, both on conceptual and measurement levels in further developing this conceptual basis into a general
theory of social welfare. By way of the third and final broad implication, let me note that recent theoretical work on industrial and
participatory democracy (e.g., Pateman, 1970, 1975; Garson and Smith,
1975), which deals with the same fundamental problem addressed here,
clearly points the directions in which a general theory of social
welfare must go. While the argument presented here reinforces and
strengthens the conceptual foundation of the case for participatory
democracy, work in that tradition provides both an immediate and
relatively concrete "program" as well as a set of concepts and empirical
methods for developing the voluntaristic-humanistic conceptual foundation of the general theory of social welfare.
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